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THE CHANCELLOR'S BOOT 
Stephen B. Burbank* 
It is a privilege to comment on a paper by Judge Weinstein, 
of whom one can say, after Justice Jackson: "He is not non-final 
because he is inferior, but he is inferior only because he is non­
final."1 At least comparing the Judge's opinion on Rule 11 sanc­
tions in Eastway Construction Corp. v. City of New York2 with 
the opinions of his "superiors"3 leaves that abiding impression. 
A comparison of those opinions also recalls another tribute to 
Walter Wheeler Cook,4 whose deconstruction of Joseph Beale's 
vested rights theory, in the words of Brainerd Currie, "discred­
ited ... [it] as thoroughly as the intellect of one man can ever 
discredit the intellectual product of another."11 One hears much 
these days about the independence of the federal judiciary; one 
hears less about the independence of individual federal judges. I 
suspect that Judge Weinstein's years in academe contributed 
more than deep learning to his career as a judge. 
For one in my position to spend all his time distributing 
bouquets would be as surprising as a book reviewer spending 
any of his time talking about the book.6 Lest I surprise the 
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1968, J.D. 1973, Harvard Uni­
versity. The author presented these comments on Judge Weinstein's paper, together with 
comments on a paper by Dean Paul Carrington, Duke Law School, at the meeting of the 
Section of Civil Procedure, American Association of Law Schools, on January 9, 1988. 
' See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
2 637 F. Supp. 558 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (demonstrating on remand why sanctions 
inappropriate). 
3 Eastway Const. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985) (reversing 
denial of sanctions and requiring sanction of attorney's fees); Eastway Const. Corp. v. 
City of New York, 821 F.2d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 1987) (increasing sanction of $1,000 im­
posed by Judge Weinstein on client to $10,000 on client and attorney without explana­
tion why the former constituted an abuse of discretion). 
• Dean Carrington's paper, see supra note*, was entitled "An Appreciation of Wal­
ter Wheeler Cook, Erie, and the Rules Enabling Act." 
• B. CuRRIE, SELECTED EssAYS ON THE CoNFLICT or LAws 6 (1963). 
Book reviews are of two types: those in which the reviewer has read the 
book, and those (the vast majority) in which he has not. When the book has 
been read this is shown by pointing out a few printers' errors, but this is the 
only difference between the two, and, normally, a perfectly satisfactory review 
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reader, I will offer a few observations about Judge Weinstein's 
paper that are intended to suggest different perspectives, per­
spectives that may inform our thinking about the procedure of 
the future. 
In his paper Judge Weinstein demonstrates both the power­
ful vision of justice that has marked his career as a judge and 
the practical vision of politics that has marked his career as a 
scholar. The paper raises, at least for me, the question whether 
the Judge has succeeded in reconciling those visions and, more 
important, whether they can and should be reconciled as we con­
template procedure for the twenty-first century. 
Judge Weinstein indicates that, in his courtroom, "the fed­
eral rules are of little significance."7 He also chronicles various 
respects in which the system of open access that came to be as­
sociated with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has in recent 
years been modified, formally and informally, attributing a de­
cline in "society's egalitarian consciousness"8 to "massive demo­
graphic, economic and sociological factors rather than the details 
of the Federal Rules."9 But, having earlier observed that 
"[j]udicial reform, though almost invisible, can have powerful 
secondary effects on society, "10 he takes heart in the notion that 
"the inertia inherent in any procedural system, and the institu­
tional structures which have an interest in maintaining the sta­
tus quo, ensure that swift radical changes in procedure are un­
likely."11 Finally, Judge Weinstein finds in the Federal Rules 
and Erie "useful windows into the personality of our legal sys­
tem," which he defines as "compassion for people who claim to 
have been wronged, . . . reliance on the good sense of judges, 
... faith in the usefulness of lawyers, and, ultimately, . . opti­
mistic confidence that the people will use their political institu­
tions for what is right and decent."�2 
What we have here, I suggest, is a combination of personal 
can be produced after a brief perusal of the Author's Preface, which is 
designed for just this purpose. 
Anonymous, How to Become a Jurist, 7 J. Soc'v Pus. L. TcHRS. 129, 133 (1963). 
7 Weinstein, The Ghost of Process Past: The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure and Erie, 54 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1, 28 (1988). 
8 !d. 
9 !d. 
10 !d. at 2. 
11 !d. at 27. 
12 !d. at 29-30. 
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politics and wishful thinking. To the extent that the Federal 
Rules are merely charters for discretionary decision-making,13 it 
is no surprise that they are of little significance in Judge Wein­
stein's courtroom - or in the courtroom of federal judges who 
do not share his politics. What reason have we to hope that, as 
judges of Jack Weinstein's sympathies are replaced by those 
whose interests lie elsewhere, "the personality of our legal sys­
tem" he describes willl}ot seem as remote as the history of the 
Rules Enabling Act? If indeed the courthouse door has been 
closed as a result of "demographic, economic and sociological 
factors"14 - the economic part of that equation at least requires 
refinement - are not more far-reaching modifications in atti­
tudes towards litigation and towards individual rights assured? 
A historical view hardly supports Judge Weinstein's descrip­
tion of "the personality of our legal system," but history does 
illuminate the tensions that are evident in his paper. How re­
markable that individuals of such radically different politics as 
William Howard Taft and Charles Clark should have supported 
the bill that became the Rules Enabling Act. Grant that Clark 
would have been as unhappy as Judge Weinstein with recent de­
velopments, would Taft? I venture that Taft would have been 
pleased, both because those developments are consistent with 
what I understand of his politics15 and because they have come 
about through exercises of power by judges, at times in the teeth 
of contrary legislation. In the field of procedure, Taft was largely 
responsible for ensuring that two personalities became one, as 
equity gobbled up common law.16 We should neither be sur­
prised that, in this field, there are now almost as many personal­
ities as there are federal judges, nor that what some chancellors 
have given, others are taking away.17 
If only because we are seeing fewer and fewer judges like 
Jack Weinstein, perhaps we should take more seriously the duty 
13 See, e.g., Burbank, The Costs of Complexity (Book Review), 85 MICH. L. REv. 
1463, 1473-76 (1987). 
" Weinstein, supra note 7, at 28. 
" See, e.g., Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of 
Ciuil Procedure in Historical Perspectiue, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 909, 952-56 (1987); Bur­
bank, Proposals to Amend Rule 68 - Time to Abandon Ship, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 425, 
427 (1986). 
16 See Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1015, 1069-76 
(1982); Subrin, supra note 15, at 956-61. 
" Burbank, supra note 13, at 1470. 
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he acknowledges of applying the law to the facts. In order to do 
that, we will need to be able to ascertain what the law is, and it 
will be necessary to curb judges' power to deny or subvert sub­
stance in the guise of procedure. It may also be necessary to 
regain a measure of confidence in the Congress. After all, as 
Judge Weinstein admits/8 the rulemakers botched Rule 4 before 
Congress completed the job, and it was congressional pressure 
that sealed the fate of proposals to amend Rule 68.19 More gen­
erally, it is judges who have been closing the courthouse door, 
not Congress. That they have been doing it under a system of 
equity rules may make the suggestion that we consider putting 
more law in a merged system20 seem not "stingier,"21 as Judge 
Weinstein describes it, but more liberal, at least in the sense of 
valuing rights. Senator Walsh had good reason to be worried. 
18 See Weinstein, supra note 7. at 29. 
19 See Burbank, supra note 15, at 439-40. 
20 See Subrin, supra note 15, at 982-1002; Burbank, supra note 13. passim. 
21 Weinstein, supra note 7, at 3. 
